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319 
THE REBIRTH OF FEDERAL TAKINGS REVIEW? THE 
COURTS’ “PRUDENTIAL” ANSWER TO WILLIAMSON 






In the 1985 decision of Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,1 the Supreme Court 
articulated one of the most controversial and puzzling constitutional 
principles of the modern era: the idea that one must unsuccessfully 
sue for monetary compensation in state court before asserting in fed-
eral court that a local government or a state has taken property in vio-
lation of the Takings Clause.2 
Commentators have long criticized this state court litigation 
requirement as a concept that exists without a logical or doctrinal ba-
sis and as a rule that is self-defeating and unfair in practice because it 
nullifies, instead of secures, federal court review.3  Indeed, applica-
 
 Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. 
1 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
2 Id. at 194-97.  Although the Williamson County Court designed the state litigation 
requirement to apply only to federal takings claims seeking a remedy under the Fifth 
Amendment’s “Just Compensation” Clause, some courts have extended the requirement to 
federal due process and equal protection claims arising from land use disputes.  See general-
ly J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson County’s Baseless 
“State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41 URB. LAW. 
615 (2009).  This aspect of the state litigation doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: 
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-
Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 673 (2004) [hereinafter Shell Game]; Michael M. Berger, 
Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
99, 102 (2000); J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You Can Never Leave: The Story 
of the San Remo Hotel—The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State 
Courts Under a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 247, 283-98 (2006) [hereinafter The Story of the San Remo Hotel]; J. David 
Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How The 
1
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tion of the rule has resulted in so many unjust “anomalies” in federal 
takings jurisdiction that four Supreme Court justices called it “mis-
taken” in the 2005 decision of San Remo Hotel v. City and County of 
San Francisco,4 and urged its reconsideration.5 
To date, the Court has declined to directly reassess William-
son County’s state litigation ripeness doctrine.  Nevertheless, since 
San Remo, the doctrine has weakened considerably.  Ten years ago, 
the state litigation requirement was an inevitable and nearly insur-
mountable barrier to federal court review of a takings claim.  This is 
no longer true.  The doctrine is now often waived by courts and evad-
ed by takings litigants.6 
This shift has its genesis in recent Supreme Court decisions, 
including San Remo, that have indirectly undercut the state litigation 
requirement by holding that it is a “prudential” ripeness rule.7  Lower 
courts have leveraged this development to transform the state litiga-
tion requirement into a discretionary ripeness concept8 that they can 
decline to apply.9  The courts’ increasing utilization of this approach 
allows some takings claimants into federal court and neutralizes the 
harshest results flowing from enforcement of Williamson County 
ripeness doctrine, namely, its tendency to combine with preclusion10 
and federal removal rules11 to totally deny judicial review to takings 
 
England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the 
Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 210 
(2003) [hereinafter Overcoming]; Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use Be Different? Re-
flection on Williamson County Regional Planning Board v. Hamilton Bank, in TAKING SIDES 
ON TAKINGS ISSUES 471, 473-74 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); Gregory Overstreet, Update 
on the Continuing and Dramatic Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal Land Use Liti-
gation, 20 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 25, 27 (1997); Scott A. Keller, Judicial Jurisdiction 
Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness: Eliminating the Williamson County State Litigation 
Requirement for Regulatory Takings Claims, 85 TEX. L. REV. 199, 240 (2006). 
4 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
5 Id. at 341 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
6 See Overcoming, supra note 3, at 264. 
7 545 U.S. at 351 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Stop the Beach Renourishment v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 728 (2010). 
8 See Overcoming, supra note 3, at 212. 
9 See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
10 Claim and issue preclusion rules generally bar federal courts from adjudicating cases 
raising issues or claims that were previously litigated by the same parties in a prior lawsuit.  
See Allan v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-96 (1980); see also infra notes 68-70 and accompa-
nying text. 
11 The reference here is to the right of defendants to remove cases raising federal issues 
from state court to federal court under the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
(2006).  See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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claimants.12 
The “prudential” transformation of Williamson County’s state 
litigation ripeness requirement, and its resulting decline as a barrier to 
federal takings review, is not uniform across federal circuits.  Never-
theless, it is occurring.  This paper reviews recent federal court deci-
sions that have loosened the state litigation ripeness barrier to federal 
takings review based on its “prudential” character.  Part II provides 
relevant background on Williamson County and the development of 
the state litigation rule.  It explores the logic underlying the rule and 
the problems it causes in application.  Part III reviews the judicial 
shift away from a jurisdictional understanding of the state litigation 
rule—under which compliance with the rule is a prerequisite to a 
court’s power to hear a takings claim—to a prudential view in which 
application of the state litigation rule lies within the court’s discre-
tion.  The article then reviews circuit court decisions that have de-
clined to enforce the state litigation rule.  It concludes that courts act 
correctly when they view the prudential nature of the state litigation 
rule as a license to balance fairness and other considerations in decid-
ing whether to apply or not apply the rule, and that this understanding 
provides a partial solution to the jurisdictional confusion and inequity 
resulting from Williamson County. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE LITIGATION RIPENESS 
DOCTRINE AND ITS FLAWS IN THEORY AND IN APPLICATION 
A. Williamson County’s Facts and Procedure 
The Williamson County case arose from a dispute over devel-
opment of a residential cluster subdivision outside Nashville, Tennes-
see.13  After the developer constructed a portion of the approved sub-
division, Williamson County altered the zoning rules, lowering 
allowable building densities.14  This undercut the final phases of the 
project and required the developer to resubmit its plat for review un-
der the new rules.  The county planning commission (Commission) 
rejected the resubmitted plan as inconsistent with its new, reduced 
 
12 See infra notes 68-70, and accompanying text. 
13 Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 729 
F.2d 402, 406 n.5 (6th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
14 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 178. 
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density standards.15  The developer then went bankrupt and its inter-
ests were acquired by Hamilton Bank (Bank).16 
The Bank resubmitted a plat for the final phase of the subdivi-
sion after it acquired the subject property, but that too was rejected.17  
The Bank then sued the Commission in federal court, alleging that 
denial of the plat caused a taking without just compensation and vio-
lated the Bank’s due process rights.18  A jury invalidated the plat de-
nial, and awarded the Bank damages for a temporary taking of its 
property interests.19  However, the trial judge granted judgment for 
the County notwithstanding the jury verdict.20  The Sixth Circuit sub-
sequently reversed the lower court, upholding the jury verdict.21  The 
Commission then successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for cer-
tiorari. 
B. The Creation of the State Litigation Rule 
1. The Williamson County Opinion 
On certiorari, the issue before the Court in Williamson County 
was “whether Federal, State, and Local governments must pay money 
damages to a landowner whose property allegedly has been ‘taken’ 
temporarily by the application of government regulations.”22  Yet, in 
its opinion, the Court ignored this issue and focused instead on the 
ripeness of the Bank’s claims. 
In a decision authored by Justice Blackmun, the Court initial-
ly ruled that the Bank’s federal takings claim was not ripe because 
the Commission had not reached a “final decision” as to application 
of its restrictions to the Bank’s property.23  More specifically, the 
Court held that the Bank could have sought exceptions, in the form of 
variances, to soften some of the Commission’s subdivision re-
strictions.24  Since the Bank did not do so, the Commission’s re-
 
15 Id. at 179-80. 
16 Id. at 181. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 182. 
19 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 182-83. 
20 Id. at 183. 
21 Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 729 F.2d at 409. 
22 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 185. 
23 Id. at 186. 
24 Id. at 187-88. 
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strictions were not final, and without such finality, the Court ex-
plained, it could not apply federal takings standards to the Commis-
sion’s decisions to determine if they violated the Bank’s rights under 
the Takings Clause.25 
Although the Williamson County Court’s final decision ripe-
ness analysis effectively ended the case, the Court went on to apply a 
second, entirely novel ripeness barrier to the Bank’s claim.26  The 
Court held that the Bank’s federal takings claim was unripe not only 
because the Commission had not yet made a final agency decision, 
but also because the Bank failed to use state procedures potentially 
capable of providing it with just compensation.27  Starting from the 
premise that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit takings of prop-
erty, but only takings “without just compensation,” the Court con-
cluded that a property owner cannot claim a violation of the Takings 
Clause “until it has used the [state’s] procedure[s] and been denied 
just compensation.”28 
Applying this new rule in Williamson County, the Court held 
that the Bank’s federal takings claim was premature because it had 
failed to use Tennessee’s inverse condemnation procedure—a judi-
cial action.29  Courts soon interpreted this part of Williamson County 
to mean that takings plaintiffs must unsuccessfully litigate for com-
pensation in state courts to ripen their takings claim.30  The “state 
procedures” ripeness concept has thus become known as the “state 
litigation” ripeness requirement.31 
 
25 Id. at 191. 
26 Id. at 194. 
27 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194. 
28 Id. at 194-95. 
29 Id. at 196-97. 
30 See Austin v. Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] landowner must 
seek and be denied compensation through state procedures, including an inverse condemna-
tion action in state court . . . .”); Snaza v. City of St. Paul, 548 F.3d 1178, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 
2008) (“Under Williamson Cnty., a property owner may not bring a federal claim for viola-
tion of the Just Compensation Clause until it has exhausted any available state procedure . . . 
Minnesota has an adequate procedure . . .  by which individuals may seek just compensation 
in its [state] district courts.”); Peters v. Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating the 
plaintiff “has not met his burden of demonstrating that it would be futile to pursue available 
remedies in state court” to satisfy Williamson Cnty.); Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. 
Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The Rhode Island Constitution prohibits the 
taking of private property for public use without just compensation and Rhode Island state 
courts have long allowed recovery through suits for inverse condemnation. Thus, Rhode Is-
land has an adequate process available to address [the] suit for just compensation.”) (empha-
sis added). 
31 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 349 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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In San Remo, the Court held that the state litigation require-
ment does not apply in state courts.32  After San Remo, a property 
owner may file a federal takings claim along with state law claims in 
state court without first demonstrating that she has sought compensa-
tion through a state’s procedures.33  Thus, the state litigation require-
ment is a federal court ripeness requirement only. 
C. The Questionable Logic Behind the State Litigation 
Rule 
For almost thirty years, the state litigation rule has dominated 
the federal courts’ consideration of federal takings claims.  It is there-
fore appropriate to briefly consider the doctrinal propriety of the rule. 
As previously noted, the Williamson County Court derived the 
state litigation requirement from the “without just compensation” 
portion of the Takings Clause.34  Based on this language, the Court 
reasoned that there is no actionable taking until a takings claimant 
seeks and is denied compensation, and thus is “without just compen-
sation.”35  This led the Court to conclude that a property owner must 
use state court procedures capable of providing compensation before 
a federal takings claim accrues.36 
On the surface, this syllogism might appear unremarkable.  
But a closer look reveals at least two problematic assumptions under-
lying the Court’s reasoning.  First, the Court’s logic wrongly assumes 
that the Just Compensation Clause functions solely as a promise that 
monetary damages will follow after an invasion of property.37 
There is no obvious reason to adopt this narrow, remedial 
 
32 Id. at 346 (stating Williamson Cnty. “does not preclude state courts from hearing 
simultaneously a plaintiff’s request for compensation under state law and a claim that, in the 
alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution”). 
33 Id.; see also Kitchen v. City of Newport News, 657 S.E.2d 132, 139 (2008) (“In 
[San Remo Hotel], the Supreme Court specifically rejected the ‘contention that Williamson 
County forbids plaintiffs from advancing their federal claims in state courts.’ ”). 
34 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194-95. 
35 Id.; see also id. at 195 n.13 (“[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings 
without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has 
been denied.  The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner 
utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.”). 
36 Id. at 194-95. 
37 Id. at 195-96 (analogizing to the Tucker Act, which authorizes damages against the 
United States, and requiring the Bank to use an inverse condemnation procedure, which pro-
vided a right to “sue for damages”). 
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construction.  The “just compensation” language of the Takings 
Clause is as easily conceived of as a condition precedent to the exer-
cise of the government’s power to take property, as a post-takings 
damages guarantee.38  And in fact, courts consistently followed the 
former reading until Williamson County.39  Under pre-Williamson 
precedent, a property owner could enjoin the government from taking 
property if it did so without first paying adequate compensation or es-
tablishing a mechanism for its prompt payment, and also potentially 
sue for damages that had already occurred.40  A violation of the Tak-
ings Clause thus accrued at the time of the property invasion, if there 
was no statutory or administrative provision at that time which en-
sured prompt payment of compensation to the property owner.41  Wil-
 
38 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890) (“[T]he 
owner is entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation 
before his occupancy is disturbed.”); see generally Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional 
Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 57, 60 (1999); Overcoming, supra note 3, at 219-20 (reading the “without just 
compensation” language as a condition on the government’s power to invade private proper-
ty as consistent with the purpose of the Bill of Rights as a whole: to limit the government’s 
power to invade individual rights). 
39 See Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End? Horne v. Department of Agricul-
ture, and the Future of Williamson County, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 245, 251-57 (2013); 
Brauneis, supra note 38, at 60-61. 
40 Brauneis, supra note 38, at 67-68; Thacher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 35 Mass. 501, 
502 (1836) (“[S]upposing that the act could be so construed, as to confer a power on the cor-
poration to take private property for public use, without providing for an equitable assess-
ment, and for the payment of an adequate indemnity, the act would, in this respect, be in 
contravention of the constitution of this Commonwealth, and in this respect void . . . the con-
sequence would be, that the party damaged would be remitted to his [damages] remedy at 
common law.”); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 31 N.W. 365, 366 (Minn. 1887) (“So 
far as the section [of a legislative act] requires railroad companies to let other persons into 
possession of any portion of their land without the compensation required by the constitu-
tion, it is invalid.”); In re Application for Drainage of Lands between Lower Chatham & Lit-
tle Falls, 35 N.J.L. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1872) (stating that just compensation is satisfied when an 
act authorizing taking provided for means to deduce and disburse compensation); see also 
Brauneis, supra note 38, at 65 (“If the plaintiff’s [takings] argument prevailed, the court de-
clared the legislation void, and the defendant’s justification failed.  Once the defendant was 
stripped of his justification, the plaintiff could recover the retrospective damages normally 
allowed under his common law action, and could obtain prospective relief by means of an 
action of ejectment or a suit in equity seeking an injunction.”). 
41 See Hawley, supra note 39, at 248-50; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 28 
(Cal. 1979) (“[I]f regulative legislation is so unreasonable or arbitrary as virtually to deprive 
a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his property, it comes within the purview of 
the law of eminent domain.  Such legislation is . . . invalid as an exercise of the power of em-
inent domain since no provision is made for compensation.”) (quoting 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 1.4291 (3d rev. ed. 1978)); Cribbs v. Benedict, 44 S.W. 707, 709 (Ark. 1897) 
(“[I]f it be conceded that compensation . . . is not provided in the act, that fact would not 
render it void, but only ineffectual to take the land in invitum.”). 
7
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liamson County sharply diverged from this historic view in constru-
ing the Just Compensation Clause as simply a right to seek damages 
for an already completed property invasion, and from there, conclud-
ing that a violation of the Takings Clause does not accrue until some 
post-invasion process shows that damages will not be forthcoming. 
The state litigation requirement is faulty, even if one accepts 
the Court’s post-takings damages view of the Just Compensation 
Clause, because it rests on a second logical fallacy: that a taking oc-
curs without damages only when a state court refuses to award them.  
Why should the post-invasion actions of a court determine whether 
an invasion of property is accompanied by damages; i.e, whether a 
taking is “without just compensation?”42  The state court is not the 
entity taking property.43  Takings almost always arise from the acts of 
a local government or a state agency, and these entities’ obligation to 
pay compensation arises at the time of the taking, not later.44  Given 
these principles, it seems apparent that the actions and authority of 
the entity causing the taking should determine whether damages will 
be forthcoming and thus, whether (still accepting Williamson’s reme-
dial/damages view of the Just Compensation Clause) a claim for a vi-
olation of the Takings Clause has accrued. 
The Williamson County Court never explained why it opted to 
hinge the “without just compensation” determination on a state 
 
42 Shell Game, supra note 3, at 694 (“There is nothing in . . . the language of the Fifth 
Amendment that requires municipal nonpayment [of compensation] to be certified by a state 
court before it is complete.”). 
43 In Stop the Beach, a plurality of the Court held that courts could effect a “judicial 
taking” if they distorted state law so as to strip property owners of settled, pre-existing prop-
erty rights.  See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715 (“If a legislature or a court declares that 
what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that 
property . . . .”).  Interestingly, the plurality appeared to hold that the remedy for a taking 
effected by a state court would be invalidation of the decision, not damages.  Id. at 723.  This 
suggests that a person whose property is taken by a state court need not ask that court for 
“just compensation” before he has an actionable federal takings claim.  Id.  On the other 
hand, under Williamson Cnty., one whose property is taken by a non-judicial agency; i.e., an 
executive or legislative entity, must unsuccessfully ask a court that did not carry out the tak-
ing for damages before his takings claim against the responsible entity accrues.  473 U.S. at 
194-95. 
44 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (stating that the government’s duty to pay just compensation is triggered 
“[a]s soon as private property has been taken.”); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 
(“[T]he usual rule is that the time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking and ‘[i]t is that 
event which gives rise to the claim for compensation.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Dow, 357 
U.S. 17, 22 (1958)); see also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) (The tak-
ings defendant’s compensatory “obligation” accrues at the time of the taking.). 
8
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court’s denial of damages, rather than on the acts, omissions and au-
thority of the entity taking property.  No good explanation can be 
found.  State entities are generally not liable for the constitutional in-
fractions of political subdivisions.45  42 U.S.C. Section 1983, under 
which most federal takings claims are raised, independently binds lo-
cal governments to the Fifth Amendment.46  And the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly emphasized that individuals asserting a violation of 
their rights by a local government in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 need not exhaust state judicial remedies.47  All of this 
confirms that a property owner should have a complete claim for a 
federal taking when the agency causing the taking has no provision or 
authority to pay damages at the time of the taking, not—as William-
son County holds—when a state court refuses to award damages af-
terward.48 
D. The State Litigation Rule Turns “Ripe” Claims 
into Dead Ones and Allows Removing Defendants 
to Deprive Property Owners of a Judicial Forum 
for their Takings Claim 
The Williamson County Court’s decision to hinge the issue of 
whether a taking has occurred without just compensation, and thus, 
whether an actionable takings claim exists, on a state court judgment 
has profound practical consequences.  By requiring a would-be tak-
ings plaintiff to go through state court litigation, the Court ensured 
 
45 Caldwell v. Comm’rs of Highways of Towns of Scott, Mahomet, & Sangamon, 94 
N.E. 490, 493 (Ill. 1911) (stating the state typically “assumes no liability” for local govern-
ment takings). 
46 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978). 
47 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (stating that in Section 1983 cas-
es, “we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing 
the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional 
rights”). 
48 See Henry Paul Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 989 (1986) (“No authority supports use of ripe-
ness doctrine to bar federal judicial consideration of an otherwise sufficiently focused con-
troversy simply because corrective state judicial process had not been invoked.”); John F. 
Preis, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 726 (2008) 
(stating that a civil rights plaintiff relies on state remedies, including in takings cases, and 
such reliance is a “marked change in past practice.”); Michael Wells, “Available State Rem-
edies” and the Fourteenth Amendment: Comments on Florida Prepaid v. College Savings 
Bank, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (“A central principle of constitutional law . . . is that 
the constitutional violation is complete when officials act, even if their conduct is not author-
ized by state law.”). 
9
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that such a plaintiff would run head-on into other potentially conflict-
ing federal doctrines, such as claim and issue preclusion and removal 
jurisdiction, that conspire to defeat, rather than secure, judicial review 
of Fifth Amendment takings claims. 
1. Preclusion Doctrines Bar Federal Review of 
Takings Claims Ripened by State Litigation 
Williamson County clearly conceived of the state litigation 
rule as a temporary bar to federal judicial review of takings claims,49 
but in practice it functions as a total bar to that review. 
The central problem is that prosecution of a state court “just 
compensation” suit will trigger application of the Full Faith and 
Credit Act50 at the federal level when the takings plaintiff tries to file 
a federal action.  The Full Faith and Credit Act requires federal courts 
to apply the state law doctrines of “claim preclusion” (otherwise 
known as res judicata) and “issue preclusion” (otherwise known as 
collateral estoppel) to suits that replicate prior judicial actions.51  Un-
der preclusion principles, federal courts may not hear claims that 
were or could have been litigated in a prior suit between the same 
parties, and it also may not adjudicate issues that were raised in a pri-
or state court suit involving the same events.52 
A straightforward application of preclusion rules bars any 
federal suit arising after a prior state court action on the same claims 
or issues, whether for ripeness purposes or otherwise.  Thus, when a 
property owner litigates in state court to ripen a takings claim for re-
view in a federal court, in compliance with Williamson County, this 
very action will preclude the promised federal review.53 
 
49 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194 n.13 (1985) (“[A] property owner [must] utilize 
procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a [section] 1983 action.”) (emphasis 
added); see also DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2004); Dodd v. Hood 
River Cnty., 59 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We disagree . . . with the suggestion that 
Williamson County is a thinly-veiled attempt by the Court to eliminate the federal forum for 
Fifth Amendment taking plaintiffs . . . .”). 
50 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948). 
51 The Act specifically provides that “judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full 
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as 
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . .”  Id.; In Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980), the Court explained that the Act required federal courts to apply the 
claim and issue preclusion rules of the states. 
52 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 336 n.16. 
53 Id. at 333. 
Williamson and its progeny place Plaintiffs in a precarious situation.  
10
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As the Seventh Circuit has explained: 
Although the Williamson line of cases that requires the 
property owner to seek compensation in the state 
courts speaks in terms of “exhaustion” of remedies, 
that is a misnomer.  For if . . . the property owner goes 
through the entire state proceeding, and he loses, he 
cannot maintain a federal suit.  The failure to complain 
of the taking under federal as well as state law is a 
case of “splitting” a claim, thus barring by virtue of 
the doctrine of res judicata a subsequent suit under 
federal law.54 
In short, a Fifth Amendment takings claim ripened by prior state 
court litigation is a claim that must normally be dismissed in federal 
court under one or more variations of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel.55 
Although some lower federal courts have attempted to create 
exceptions to preclusion doctrine56 that would allow takings claims 
ripened through state litigation in federal court, the Supreme Court 
rejected this approach in San Remo.57  The Court held that federal 
courts could not excuse “ripe” federal takings claims from preclusion 
barriers simply because Williamson County forced the plaintiff to sue 
in state court first.58 
Four justices led by former Chief Justice Rehnquist issued a 
 
Plaintiffs must seek redress from the State court before their federal tak-
ing claims ripen, and failure to do so will result in dismissal by the fed-
eral court.  However, once having gone through the State court system, 
plaintiffs who then try to have their federal claims adjudicated in a fed-
eral forum face, in many cases, potential preclusion defenses.  This ap-
pears to preclude completely litigants such as those in the case at bar 
from bringing federal taking claims in a federal forum . . . . 
W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. Town of Southampton, 220 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
54 Rockstead v. City of Crystal Lake, 486 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2007). 
55 DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 520.  If the federal claim is actually raised in state court, it is 
barred in any later suit by the simplest form of claim preclusion.  If it is left out of the state 
court suit, it “is a case of ‘splitting’ ” a claim, and the claim is barred from the later suit be-
cause it could have been raised in the prior suit.  Rockstead, 486 F.3d at 968.  Moreover, the 
plaintiff is barred under issue preclusion from re-litigating any factual and legal issues liti-
gated in the state court.  San Remo, 545 U.S. at 336. 
56 See Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 
2003), abrogated by San Remo, 545 U.S. at 323; Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 
953 F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 1992). 
57 545 U.S. at 331. 
58 Id. 
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concurring opinion in San Remo, which criticized the state litigation 
ripeness doctrine and urged the Court to overrule the doctrine in the 
“appropriate case.”59  But no justice was prepared to take such a step 
in San Remo itself.60  Consequently, San Remo left Williamson Coun-
ty’s state litigation predicate for federal takings review intact, while 
confirming that preclusion rules will usually prevent federal review 
of fully ripe claims.61  As the San Remo Court stated, this scheme 
leaves property owners with only one option for litigating their feder-
al takings claim: they must raise it in the initial state court action re-
quired by Williamson County.62  They must use it in state court litiga-
tion or they will lose it.63 
Commentators have rightly castigated the state litiga-
tion/preclusion trap as an unjust and unjustified scheme for stripping 
property owners of their ability to protect their federal constitutional 
rights in a federal court, in the same manner as other classes of citi-
zens.64  While San Remo approved of this framework, it did so with-
 
59 Id. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
60 Id. at 340 (majority opinion). 
61 Not surprisingly, lower federal courts continued to issue contradictory directions on 
the availability of federal jurisdiction over a federal takings claim under Williamson Cnty.  
For instance, in Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Township, the Sixth Circuit stated, “in order for 
a plaintiff to bring a takings claim in federal court, he or she must first pursue available rem-
edies in state court.”  519 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2008).  But the same year, the same court 
declared in Trafalgar Corporation v. Miami County Board of Commissioners, that because 
“the issue of just compensation under the Takings clause . . . was directly decided in a previ-
ous state court action, it cannot be re-litigated in federal district court.”  519 F.3d 285, 287 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
62 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 323. 
63 It bears noting that a would-be federal takings claimant has no escape from the pre-
clusion trap.  He cannot, for instance, avoid preclusion barriers at the federal level by filing 
and litigating a state court complaint that does not include a federal takings claim.  While the 
most straightforward form of federal claim preclusion (that barring re-litigation of a previ-
ously litigated claim) would not bar the takings claim in this scenario, the claim would still 
be subject to, and barred by issue preclusion or claim-splitting barriers (could have been liti-
gated in a prior suit) when it arrives in federal court.  See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 338 (dis-
cussing issue preclusion); Rockstead, 486 F.3d at 968 (discussing claim-splitting). 
64 See James W. Ely, Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the 
Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39-66 (2005); Thomas E. 
Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 71 (1995) (“One understandable reaction to the prong two [state com-
pensation procedures] requirement . . . is that it perpetrates a fraud or hoax on landowners.  
The courts say: ‘Your suit is not ripe until you seek compensation from the state courts,’ ” 
but when the landowner does these things, the court says: “Ha ha, now it is too late.”); Ber-
ger, supra note 3, at 102 (describing the state procedures rule as applied by lower courts as 
“bizarre” and not “what the Williamson County court intended because it is inherently non-
sensical and self-stultifying.”); Overstreet, supra note 3, at 27 (state procedures requirement 
12
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out providing any plausible justification for the outcome: the relega-
tion of federal takings claims to state courts.65  Certainly, shutting 
takings plaintiffs out of the federal court system is wholly incon-
sistent with the Court’s Section 1983 precedent, which recognizes 
that the “very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts 
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s feder-
al rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under 
color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or 
judicial.’ ”66 
Williamson County’s evisceration of the federal courts’ ability 
 
has “dramatic” and “absurd” application); Buchsbaum, supra note 3 at 473-74; (“This under-
lying premise [that the government has not] acted illegally until you ask for compensation 
and then it is denied is, of course, untrue.”); Keller, supra note 3, at 240 (“The Supreme 
Court has stated that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment should not be ‘relegated' to 
a status below that of other provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Yet, the Williamson County 
State Litigation prong does just that.”). 
65 See The Story of the San Remo Hotel, supra note 3, at 283-90.  In San Remo, the 
Court suggested that principles of state-federal comity might justify sending all takings 
claims to state courts.  In so doing, the Court cited to its decision in Fair Assessment in Real 
Estate Association v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), a case holding that claims challenging 
state taxation schemes should be decided by the state courts out of respect for their unique 
sovereignty in that particular area. 
 As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in his concurring San Remo opinion, the Fair As-
sessment comity justification is insufficient to explain the banishing of Fifth Amendment 
takings claims from federal court.  545 U.S. at 349-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  First, if 
courtesy for state sovereignty justifies granting state courts exclusive jurisdiction over tak-
ings claims arising from local land use actions, the same principle should bar any federal 
constitutional claim arising from local controls.  Id.  But this is, of course, not the case.  In 
fact, in the post-civil war framework, the need for federal review of alleged local and state 
civil rights violations has always trumped concern about interfering with state processes.  
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (“[I]t was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its judicial 
discretion to dismiss a suit simply because a State court could entertain it.”). 
 Aside from such general objections, the Fair Assessment comity case simply does not 
harbor any principle supporting the relegation of federal takings claims as a whole to state 
courts.  Fair Assessment merely restricted federal review over one specific type of subject 
matter, state taxation codes.  McNary, 454 U.S. at 116 (barring assertion of Section 1983 
claims “against the validity of state taxation systems”).  But the Williamson Coun-
ty/preclusion barrier sanctioned by San Remo goes much further.  It is not a subject matter 
limitation; it redacts an entire constitutional provision—the Fifth Amendment—from the 
federal purview.  San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346.  It bars takings claims not just against state 
taxation, but against local and state land use regulation, physical invasions and so on.  Id. at 
347.  No comity case supports this. 
66 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (quoting Mitchum v. Fos-
ter, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)); see Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 834, 865 (1927); Stefel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (stating that after the 
passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts “became the primary and powerful reliances for 
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States”). 
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to review federal takings claims is deeply troubling on its own.  But 
the resulting relegation of federal takings claimants to the state courts 
set the stage for yet another nasty snare for those claimants, this one 
arising from the interplay between the state litigation rule and a de-
fendant’s right to remove constitutionally-based state court cases to 
federal court.67 
2. Through Interaction with Federal Removal 
Jurisdiction, the State Litigation Rule Often 
Deprives Takings Claimants of Any Forum 
for their Claims 
The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a), gives 
defendants power to transfer state court complaints that raise federal 
questions to the federal courts within thirty days after the complaint 
is filed in state court.68  As a claim arising under the federal Constitu-
tion, a federal takings claim appears to raise a basic federal question 
subject to review by a federal court.69  On the other hand, San Remo 
and Williamson County hold that a takings claim is not an issue for a 
federal court unless the claimant has fully completed a prior state 
court suit for just compensation.70 
 
67 See Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 547 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[B]y re-
moving to federal court [takings] claims properly filed in state court in accordance with San 
Remo Hotel and then claiming that the plaintiff cannot proceed on those claims, [the gov-
ernment is] thereby denying a plaintiff any forum for having his claim heard”); see supra 
notes 32, 33, 53 and accompanying text. 
68 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).  The removal statute specifically provides that “any civ-
il action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have origi-
nal jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of 
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pend-
ing.”  Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888).  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
“District courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.”  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 
(1987).  In determining whether a federal question exists, courts simply consider whether 
such a question is “presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”  Id.  
Federal constitutional claims raise quintessential federal issues.  Id. 
69 Hammond v. City of Ladue, No. 4:10CV1977, 2010 WL 5392831, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 
Dec. 21, 2010) (“The alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ property rights stated a substantial 
federal question claim under the Constitution. In particular, Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation 
claim . . . rests upon the Fifth Amendment . . . .”); Morris v. Schirard, No. 10–cv–01145–
PAB–BNB, 2010 WL 3002052, at *1 (D. Col. July 28, 2010) (“Because plaintiff is asserting 
a [due process/takings] claim under the United States Constitution, this Court has jurisdic-
tion over this action, and defendants had a right to remove the case to this Court.”). 
70 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194-95; San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347; Adam Bros. 
Farming, Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142, 1147-48 (“When the state provides a 
14
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Due to this clash between the state litigation doctrine and the 
federal question character of a federal takings claim, the exercise of 
removal in the takings context can, and often does, deprive takings 
plaintiffs of any forum for their claims.  Through removal, the gov-
ernment defendant can take a federal takings claim out of the state 
court forum on federal question grounds and bring it into the federal 
court before the plaintiff completed state court litigation.  This opens 
the way for the defendant to argue that the removed takings claim is 
unripe in federal court under Williamson County.71  Despite the obvi-
ous ironies in this argument, courts often accept the argument, and 
dismiss the removed takings claim.72  Alternatively, federal courts 
simply conclude, on their own, that a removed takings claim is unripe 
in the federal forum under a literal application of Williamson Coun-
ty’s state litigation requirement.73 
The case of 8679 Trout, LLC v. North Tahoe Public Utilities 
District74 provides an apt example.  There, a property owner sued a 
utility district in state court, alleging a takings violation and various 
state law violations, after it was denied variances to convert a small, 
 
procedure by which a party may seek just compensation, such as an inverse condemnation 
cause of action, the plaintiff must seek relief in state court before bringing a claim in federal 
court.”). 
71 See, e.g., Del-Prairie Stock Farm, Inc. v. Cnty. of Walworth, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 
1032 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (“Defendants removed the case based on plaintiff’s federal takings 
and substantive due process claims.  However, defendants now move for summary judg-
ment, arguing, among other things, that I have no jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal law 
claims because under [Williamson County] they are not ripe.”); Oakland 40 LLC v. City of 
South Lyon, No. 10-14456, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 53158, at *2, *4 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 
2011) (illustrating situation where defendant removes a federal takings claim and then, when 
plaintiff files a motion to remand, files a motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiff did not 
exhaust state court proceedings); Doney v. Pacific Cnty., NO. C07-5123RJB, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34071, at *14 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2007) (arguing that removal of a federal takings 
claim was proper because it implicates a federal question, defendant thereafter asserted the 
federal court must dismiss the takings claim due to plaintiff’s inability to exhaust state pro-
cedures). 
72 See infra note 97. 
73 See, e.g., Kunzelman v. City of Scottsdale, No. CV-10-0056-PHX-GMS, 2011 WL 
3510883 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2011).  There, the Court held: 
To their credit, Plaintiffs did initially file this action in state court.  How-
ever the state court proceedings must run their course, as there must be a 
denial of compensation following those proceedings for Plaintiffs to 
claim they suffered a federal constitutional injury through a regulatory 
taking of their property.  On its own motion, the Court must dismiss the 
as-applied takings claim without prejudice. 
Id. at *11. 
74 No. 2:10-cv-01569, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93303 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010). 
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seven-unit mobile home park from rental use to resident ownership.75  
The District removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss 
under Williamson County.76 
The federal court recognized that the defendant had used re-
moval to change the state of the property owner’s claim from ripe (in 
state court) to unripe (in federal court).  It nevertheless granted the 
motion to dismiss: 
Because Defendants removed this litigation from state 
court, Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to seek 
state reimbursement.  As ripeness is a threshold juris-
dictional question, Defendants cannot confer jurisdic-
tion to this Court by removal.  Therefore, Plaintiff has 
yet to satisfy the requirements under the Williamson 
analysis to make its claim ripe for federal court adju-
dication.  Although the claim was ripe when it was 
originally filed in state court, it became unripe the 
moment that Defendants removed it.  A state action is 
“not complete until the state fails to provide adequate 
compensation for the taking.”77 
The court concluded: “Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings claim is 
dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.”78 
The federal reporter is filled with many other federal deci-
 
75 Id. at *1-4. 
76 Id. at *4.  For its part, the plaintiff sought to stay its federal takings claims so it 
could pursue compensation in state court.  Id. 
77 Id. at *13-14 (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 195). 
78 8679 Trout, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93303 at *14.  It should be noted here that 
removed takings claims dismissed from federal court for lack of state procedures ripeness 
are typically dismissed without prejudice and, therefore, may be re-filed in state court.  See, 
e.g., id. at *13.  Re-filing is, however, an unrealistic option in most takings removal cases.  
First, the statute of limitations for filing a takings claim in state court may potentially run 
during the removal and federal litigation period, precluding a second state suit.  See, e.g., 
Shands v. City of Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718, 726 (Fla. App. 2008) (holding statute of limita-
tions runs from the final agency decision); Behavioral Inst. of Ind. v. Hobart Common 
Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding the statute of limitations for Section 
1983 claims is the two year period applicable to personal injury claims).  Second, if a takings 
claim is re-filed in state court, there is nothing to prevent the takings defendant from remov-
ing the suit again, and thus from forcing the plaintiff to go through the same fruitless remov-
al/ripeness/remand cycle.  Mirto v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., No. C-04-4998-VRWG, 2005 WL 
827093, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 8, 2005) (noting in a different context that a wrongly re-
moved claim could be subjected again to removal if dismissed without prejudice and then re-
filed in state court).  Finally, it is often more financially feasible to simply abandon a dis-
missed takings claim and continue litigation of other claims not subject to Williamson Coun-
ty. 
16
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sions dismissing a federal takings claim as unripe under Williamson 
County after removal short-circuited state court litigation and brought 
the claim to federal court in a premature state.79  In some removed 
takings cases, the state litigation ripeness problem remains hidden in 
federal court until substantial federal litigation has occurred on the 
merits of the takings claim.80  But once a federal court hearing a re-
moved takings claim becomes aware of the state litigation require-
ment, the claim is often immediately dismissed even though the par-
ties and the court may have already expended substantial resources 
litigating it in the federal forum.81 
Federal cases dismissing a removed takings claim based on 
non-compliance with the state litigation rule are jarring because the 
takings plaintiff followed Williamson County perfectly.  By filing in 
state court, that plaintiff did exactly what is required to prosecute a 
federal takings claim on the merits.  And yet, through no fault of her 
own, the plaintiff’s ripe state court claim instantly becomes non-
compliant with Williamson County when the defendant removes the 
claim. She cannot remain in state court due to removal and she can-
not remain in federal court after removal due to Williamson County. 
As one court put it: “Defendants’ decision to remove this case from 
state court effectively denied [the plaintiff] an opportunity to utilize 
[the state’s] procedure for reimbursement, and brought a takings 
claim to this [federal] Court that was not ripe for review.”82  In this 
way, the state litigation rule gives takings defendants unilateral power 
to defeat a federal takings claim without any review on the merits 
 
79 Koscielski v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2006); Rau v. City of 
Garden Plain, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1174-75 (D. Kan. 1999); Ohad Assoc. LLC v. Twp. of 
Marlboro, No. 10-2183, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8414, at *4, *6 (D. N.J. Jan. 28, 2011); 
Hendrix v. Plambeck, 1:09-cv-99-SEB-DML, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92140, at *17-19 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 2, 2010); AM Rodriguez Assocs. v. City Council, No. 1:08-CV-214, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 110998, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2009); Thomas v. Shelby Cnty., No. 06-
2433 Ml/P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94365, at *10-11 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2006); Jones v. 
City of McMinnville, No. 04-0047-AA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7250, at *6 (D. Or. April 20, 
2004); Bass v. City of Dallas, NO. 3-97-CV-2327-BD, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11263, at *11 
(N.D. Tex. July 21, 1998); Standard Materials Inc. v. City of Slidell, NO. 92-2509, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8470, at *11 (E.D. La. June 21, 1994). 
80 Reahard v. Lee Cnty., 30 F.3d 1412, 1418 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding a removed tak-
ings claim to be unripe for lack of state litigation ripeness on appeal, after the claim was ful-
ly litigated on the merits in district court); Sandy Creek Investors, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown, 
325 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 2003); Anderson v. Town of Groveling, 134 F. Supp. 2d 156, 157 (D. 
Mass. 2001). 
81 See Kunzelman, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89179. 
82 Doak Homes, Inc. v. City of Tukwila, No. C07-1148MJP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7740, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Jan 18, 2008). 
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simply by choosing to remove it.  A plaintiff’s compliance with Wil-
liamson County’s demand for state court litigation sets him up to be 
dragged by a removing defendant from state court into a federal ju-
risdictional dead zone, where no takings adjudication can occur. 
In some removed takings cases, courts have remanded, rather 
than dismissed, a removed takings claim to state court upon conclud-
ing that the claim is not compliant with Williamson County’s state lit-
igation requirement.83  This remand solution is legally questionable.84  
As a practical matter, it is hardly more preferable than outright dis-
missal of the claim.  The removed and remanded takings plaintiff has 
been involuntarily yanked from the state court—which is the only 
proper forum for a takings claim—to a federal court—which is not a 
proper forum—only to be sent back to the state court because the 
claim cannot be heard in federal court until the plaintiff litigates his 
claims in state court—where it all began. 
In the meantime, the takings plaintiff’s resources and morale 
have been drained,85 and his takings claim is no closer to adjudication 
 
83 Oakland, 40 LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53158, at *8; Clark v. Town of E. Hamp-
ton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Lohman Props., LLC v. City of Las Cruces, 
No. CV 08-875, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47146, at *6-7 (D.N.M. April 20, 2009); Milliken v. 
Town of Addison, No. 3:02-CV-1164-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17237, at *14 (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 13, 2002); Doney, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34071, at *21-22; Woodlake Partners Inc. v. 
Guadalupe Cnty., No. 511-CV-00647-XR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133161, at *5,*7 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 Unlike cases dismissing removed takings claims as unripe, decisions that remand such 
claims arise from a court’s conclusion that removal was improper from the start because the 
state litigation requirement is jurisdictional and a plaintiff’s noncompliance with the re-
quirement precludes original federal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Evans v. Washington Cnty., No. 
991356, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20036, at *20 (D. Or. Dec. 10, 1999) (“Because this court 
does not have federal question jurisdiction over this action under 28 USC § 1331, removal to 
this court was improper under 28 USC § 1441.”); Carrollton Props., Ltd. v. City of Carroll-
ton, No. 406-CV-308, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65432, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2006) (order-
ing remand after observing that “[p]laintiffs have not unsuccessfully pursued just compensa-
tion in state court, thus the claim is not ripe, and it is not a [removable] federal question”).  
The “no original jurisdiction” conclusion triggers a section of the removal statute providing 
that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction [over a removed complaint], the case shall be remanded.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
84 Remanding a removed takings claim to state court because the claim is unripe under 
the state litigation rule is questionable because remand can only occur under the removal 
statute if the court lacks original jurisdiction over a removed claim.  Id.  Yet, it is now clear 
that the state litigation rule is not a predicate to federal jurisdiction.  See Stop the Beach, 560 
U.S. at 728.  This suggests that the removal statute may not authorize remand of a federal 
takings claim simply because it not compliant with the state litigation rule.  Id. 
85 See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005) (“The process of 
removing a case to federal court and then having it remanded back to state court delays reso-
18
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than on the day it was filed.  His claims very likely have now been 
split, so that he now has two suits to prosecute, the takings claims in 
state court and any federal, non-takings claims in federal court. 
The Supreme Court has said that takings claimants do not 
have to endure “piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair proce-
dures.”86  Yet, this is exactly what they go through when a court re-
mands a takings claim because removal rendered it unripe under the 
state litigation requirement.  The government defendant may not ob-
tain a total triumph over the takings claim in this removal/remand 
scenario, but it often secures the same practical result when the plain-
tiff abandons the remanded federal takings claim due to financial ex-
haustion or infeasibility of piecemeal prosecution. 
No other constitutional claim is subject to such dysfunction in 
the removal process.87  To be sure, as a general matter, a defendant 
can argue in federal court that a removed claim is unripe.  But it is 
only in takings cases, and only because of Williamson County, that a 
defendant can argue that a removed claim is unripe due to lack of 
prior state court litigation; i.e., because removal itself thwarted the 
state court predicate for ripeness.88 
Takings litigation is a Kafkaesque journey to nowhere in most 
cases due to the state litigation requirement’s interaction with pre-
existing jurisdictional doctrines such as preclusion and removal.  The 
most basic decision in constitutional litigation—where and when to 
file a complaint—usually leads to a prolonged forum-chasing night-
mare in the takings context, no matter the choice that is made.  If the 
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on uncompensated takings is to sur-
 
lution of the case, imposes additional costs on both parties, and wastes judicial resources.”); 
Mich. DOT v. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., No. 10-13767, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125236, at *5 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2010) (awarding more than $30,000 to plaintiff after improper removal 
of a case because this was the amount the plaintiff had to expend to secure remand). 
86 See MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 350 n.7 (1986). 
87 See Gideon Kanner, “[Un]equal Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously Disparate 
Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1077-
78 (2007) (decrying a “legal regime in which, as required by Williamson County, aggrieved 
property owners who are denied access to the federal forum duly file their takings cases in 
state courts only to have the government defendants remove them to federal courts, and once 
there, argue that the federal courts lack jurisdiction (on account of lack of ripeness) and that 
the cases must therefore be dismissed because the plaintiffs should have sued in state court 
first (which of course they did, or at least tried to do until the defendants removed the case 
unilaterally to federal court) . . . [n]o other species of American plaintiffs are subjected to 
such judicial jiggery-pokery.”). 
88 DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 521 (“[O]ther § 1983 plaintiffs do not have the requirement 
of filing prior state-court actions.”). 
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vive as a judicially enforceable individual right,89 courts must remedy 
the takings removal problem and the federal preclusion barrier.  Since 
San Remo refused to loosen preclusion rules in takings cases to ac-
count for the state litigation rule and there is no sign that courts will 
alter the federal removal doctrine in the takings context, the only 
hope for change lies in a modification, or abandonment, of the state 
litigation ripeness doctrine.  At the least, the doctrine must become 
less rigid and less tolerant of the inequities it causes if property own-
ers are to obtain reasonable access to the courts for their federal tak-
ings claims.  Fortunately, that change appears to be occurring. 
III. WITH THE SUPREME COURT’S BLESSING, FEDERAL COURTS 
ARE TRANSFORMING THE STATE LITIGATION RULE FROM A 
JURISDICTIONAL BARRIER INTO A DISCRETIONARY, 
FLEXIBLE CONCEPT THAT CAN BE WAIVED 
For most of Williamson County’s existence, lower courts have 
viewed the state litigation ripeness requirement as a jurisdictional 
predicate.90  This understanding has been instrumental in the devel-
opment of the claim/issue preclusion trap and removal problem expe-
rienced by takings plaintiffs complying with Williamson County.  
When the state litigation rule is jurisdictional, would-be federal tak-
ings claimants cannot sue directly in federal court, but must file some 
sort of action seeking damages in state court.91  This ensures that pre-
clusion barriers will apply to any subsequent federal court suit,92 that 
 
89 Because of the difficulty and expense of securing judicial review of a federal takings 
claim under Williamson County, property owners subject to actions traditionally challenged 
under a takings theory are increasingly foregoing their Fifth Amendment rights in favor of 
claims arising under due process and equal protection concepts.  See, e.g., Penner v. City of 
Topeka, 437 Fed. Appx. 751, 753 (10th Cir. 2011) (involving due process and equal protec-
tion claims, but no takings claims, challenging repeated denials of land use permits); Ziss 
Bros. Const. Co. v. City of Independence, 439 Fed. Appx. 467, 470 (6th Cir. 2011) (involv-
ing a denial of development plat challenged only on due process and equal protection 
grounds). 
90 See, e.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1991); Reahard, 30 
F.3d at 1418.  The jurisdictional understanding dominated the courts’ consideration of the 
state litigation rule even after the Supreme Court, somewhat casually, described Williamson 
County as a whole as a “prudential” doctrine in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 
520 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1997) (involving the final decision ripeness rule). 
91 Reahard, 30 F.3d at 1418 (“[U]ntil [plaintiffs] have pursued their state remedy, the 
federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
92 See, e.g., DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 520-21; Wilkinson v. Pitkin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1998); W.J.F. Realty Corp., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 
146. 
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the plaintiff must, therefore, raise his federal takings claim in a state 
court action, and that a defendant can potentially use removal to pull 
the case into federal court in an unripe state, setting the stage for the 
plaintiff to lose his federal claim completely.93 
Fortunately, federal courts are abandoning the jurisdictional 
understanding of Williamson County.  Many have explicitly recast the 
state litigation rule as a non-jurisdictional, prudential ripeness con-
cept.94  This characterization changes the essential issue in a state lit-
igation ripeness case from whether the property owner has complied 
with the requirement, by fully exhausting state court litigation, to 
whether a federal court “should” require prior state court litigation.95  
The discretionary nature of the issue allows federal courts to choose 
to immediately hear a takings claim, thereby avoiding state court liti-
gation and negating the preclusion and removal traps that go along 
with it. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Decisions 
The Supreme Court has led the way in the repositioning of 
Williamson County as a discretionary, prudential ripeness doctrine.  
In San Remo, the concurring justices noted that the state litigation 
rule had to be “merely a prudential rule, and not a constitutional 
mandate” if plaintiffs could raise a Fifth Amendment takings claim in 
state court without first litigating a state law takings claim, as the San 
Remo majority had held.96 
 
93 See, e.g., Koscielski, 435 F.3d at 903 (rejecting argument that the state litigation 
ripeness rule could be waived after removal of a takings case because this “would require the 
Court to refuse to consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case,” and 
dismissing a federal takings claim under the state litigation doctrine after removal for lack of 
jurisdiction) (emphasis added); see Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 547 (questioning if the government 
can remove a takings and invoke Williamson County as bar to federal review because it is 
“denying a plaintiff any forum for having his claim heard”). 
94 See infra notes 97-99. 
95 Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that a prudential 
ripeness analysis considers whether the court “should exercise federal jurisdiction”); Thomas 
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“Pru-
dential considerations of ripeness are discretionary . . . .”); see also McClung v. City of 
Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Because this case raises only prudential ripe-
ness concerns, we have discretion to assume ripeness is met . . . .”). 
96 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 351 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Court 
holds that “Williamson County does not command that the state courts themselves impose 
the state-litigation requirement.  But that is so only if Williamson County’s state-litigation 
requirement is merely a prudential rule, and not a constitutional mandate . . . .”). 
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Then, in the 2010 case of Stop the Beach, the Court rejected 
the argument that a takings claim was “unripe because petitioner has 
not [previously] sought just compensation” on the ground that the ar-
gument was not raised below and was not “jurisdictional.”97  The 
Court made essentially the same observation in its recent decision in 
Horne v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,98 when it stated that “a 
Fifth Amendment claim is premature until it is clear that the Gov-
ernment has both taken property and denied just compensation.  Al-
though we often refer to this consideration as ‘prudential ripeness,’ 
we have recognized that it is not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional.”99  
These decisions clearly show that state litigation can no longer be 
treated as a necessary predicate to a federal court’s power to hear a 
federal takings claim. 
B. Lower Court Decisions 
Many circuit courts that have faced Williamson County issues 
since the Court’s decisions in San Remo and Stop the Beach have 
concluded that the state litigation rule is a prudential ripeness concept 
and can no longer be applied as a jurisdictional bar.  Others have yet 
to take a definitive position.  A few circuits continue to wrongly cling 
to a jurisdictional understanding of Williamson County’s state litiga-
tion rule—though this is most likely because these particular courts 
have not recently faced the issue. 
1. Prudential Circuits 
The Fourth,100 Fifth,101 and Ninth102 Circuit Courts now une-
 
97 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 729. 
98 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013). 
99 Id. at 2062 (citations omitted). 
100 Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2013); Sansotta, 724 
F.3d at 545 (“Williamson County is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional rule”); Acorn 
Land, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty., 402 Fed. Appx. 809, 813 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has clarified that Williamson’s ripeness prongs are ‘prudential hurdles,’ [and] not ju-
risdictional requirements.”) (citations omitted); Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 182 (4th Cir. 2000). 
101 Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church v. New Orleans City, 641 F.3d 86, 88-89 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (citing San Remo and Stop the Beach, the court “held that Williamson County’s 
ripeness requirements are merely prudential” and a prior decision considering it to raise ju-
risdictional barriers was “no longer good law”). 
102 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stat-
ing the ripeness requirement now appears to be prudential rather than jurisdictional); Adam 
Bros. Farming, 604 F.3d at 1148 (9th Cir. 2010); McClung, 548 F.3d at 1224. 
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quivocally consider the state litigation requirement to be non-
jurisdictional.  Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits previously treated 
Williamson County’s state litigation rule as a rigid jurisdictional bar-
rier, but since San Remo and Stop the Beach, they have adopted a 
prudential view of the rule.103 
2. On the Fence: Third, Sixth, Seventh, and  
Tenth Circuits 
The Third, Tenth, and Seventh Circuit Courts appear to rec-
ognize that Williamson County is rooted in prudential ripeness con-
cepts, but have yet to conclude that this means the state litigation re-
quirement is not a jurisdictional bar.104  Courts in these circuits must, 
and most likely will, make this leap soon.  The “prudential” designa-
tion given to Williamson County ripeness by the Supreme Court is 
not an empty rhetorical device.  The very purpose of the designation 
is to distinguish the state litigation rule as a non-jurisdictional ripe-
ness concept.105 
3. Jurisdictional Holdouts 
The operative precedent of the First, Second, and Eighth Cir-
cuit Courts reflects the outdated and erroneous notion that the state 
litigation requirement is jurisdictional.106  Notably, most of this prec-
 
103 See Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church, 641 F.3d at 88-89, 89 n.2; Guggenheim, 
638 F.3d at 1117-18 (tracing evolution of Ninth Circuit’s understanding that the state litiga-
tion requirement is a prudential rather than jurisdictional rule). 
104 See Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Cnty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2011); Pe-
ters v. Village of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Williamson County’s ripeness 
requirements are prudential in nature.  The prudential character of the Williamson County 
requirements do not, however, give the lower federal courts license to disregard them.”).  
Compare Miles Christi Religious Order v. Twp. of Northville, 629 F.3d 533, 541 (6th Cir. 
2010), and id. at 545 (Batchelder, C.J., dissenting) (discussing and agreeing on prudential 
nature of Williamson County), with Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Two, 519 F.3d 564, 571 
(6th Cir. 2008) (“Because the plaintiffs did not fulfill their obligation of seeking just com-
pensation in state court, we do not have jurisdiction . . . .”). 
105 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 729; Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062 (noting that the 
phrase “prudential ‘ripeness’ ” does not mean Williamson County is “jurisdictional”). 
106 See, e.g., Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island & Providence Planta-
tions, 643 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (“In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that 
the nature of a federal regulatory takings claim gives rise to two ripeness requirements which 
plaintiffs bear the burden of proving they have met before a federal court has jurisdiction 
over a takings claim.”); Snaza, 548 F.3d at 1182 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Snaza contends that . . . 
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edent pre-dates recent Supreme Court decisions, like Stop the Beach, 
holding that the state litigation rule is a prudential rule.  They are 
therefore of dubious precedential value.  In any event, there is abso-
lutely no basis in the Court’s jurisprudence for continuance of this 
approach to Williamson County. 
C. Courts Adopting the Prudential View Are 
Declining to Apply the State Litigation 
Requirement Based on Fairness and Efficiency 
Concerns 
Federal courts which have found the state litigation rule to be 
a prudential ripeness rule, have concluded this status gives them dis-
cretion to decline to apply or enforce the rule in certain circumstanc-
es.107  In particular, a number of circuit courts have held that the state 
litigation requirement is waived, and the takings plaintiff exempted 
from its application, when a defendant does not affirmatively raise or 
preserve the Williamson County ripeness issue.108  The Supreme 
Court itself came to this conclusion in Stop the Beach.109  Going one 
step further, some circuit courts have held that federal courts can 
waive the state litigation requirement on their own, based on its pru-
dential character, even when the defendant has properly preserved the 
issue.110 
Still other federal courts have held they may refuse to apply 
the state litigation requirement on the ground that considerations rel-
evant to prudential ripeness, such as efficiency, judicial economy, 
 
Williamson County . . . is prudential rather than jurisdictional and so does not bar us from 
exercising discretion to decide the takings question now.  She cites cases from the Ninth Cir-
cuit . . . but we have held that Williamson County is jurisdictional.”); see also Island Park, 
LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2009). 
107 See, e.g., Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1118 (“[We] exercise our discretion not to im-
pose the prudential requirement of exhaustion in state court.”); Adam Bros. Farming, 604 
F.3d at 1147–48 (holding the court had discretion to waive the Williamson exhaustion re-
quirement when the case raised only prudential ripeness concerns). 
108 See, e.g., Acorn Land, 402 Fed. Appx. at 813; Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church, 
641 F.3d at 88-89 (“[A]lthough a court may raise [Williamson County’s requirements] sua 
sponte, it may consider them waived or forfeited as well.”); see also Guggenheim v. City of 
Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he City of Goleta forfeited the claim that this case was not ripe for review by 
failing to raise it.”). 
109 560 U.S. at 729. 
110 See, e.g., Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1118 (declining “to impose the prudential re-
quirement of exhaustion in state court”); Adam Bros. Farming, 604 F.3d at 1148 (declining 
to apply the state litigation rule). 
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and fairness, warrant immediate takings review.111  The leading ex-
ample from a federal appellate court is Town of Nags Head v. Tolocz-
ko.112  Toloczko involved a federal takings claim and other claims that 
had been removed from state court to federal court by the plaintiff 
based on diversity jurisdiction.  The Fourth Circuit noted that the 
owner’s removal action rendered the takings claim non-compliant 
with Williamson County’s state litigation rule.113  However, for pru-
dential reasons, the court refused to apply the rule and to thereby re-
quire the takings claims be litigated in the state court system while 
other claims were decided in federal court.  The court explained: 
Because Williamson County is a prudential rather than 
a jurisdictional rule, we may determine that in some 
instances, the rule should not apply and we still have 
the power to decide the case.  Exercise of such discre-
tion may be particularly appropriate to avoid ‘piece-
meal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures.’ 
This is a proper case to exercise our discretion to sus-
pend the state-litigation requirement of Williamson 
County.  In the interests of fairness and judicial econ-
omy, we will not impose further rounds of litigation 
on the Toloczkos.114 
Finally, in Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head,115 the Fourth Cir-
cuit used prudential ripeness considerations to directly confront the 
takings removal issue.  The case dealt with a federal takings claim 
which the Town had removed from state court to federal court.  After 
a year of litigation, the Town argued the removed claim was unripe 
under Williamson County’s state litigation requirement.116  Sansotta 
rejected this contention.  In so doing, the Fourth Circuit began by es-
tablishing the prudential and discretionary nature of the state litiga-
tion rule: 
 
111 See, e.g., Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 399; Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. 
Supp. 2d 1036, 1108-10 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1118 (declining 
to apply the state litigation rule because “it would be a waste of the parties’ and the courts’ 
resources to bounce the case through more rounds of litigation” and “it is hard to see any 
value in forcing a second trip [to state court] on them”). 
112 728 F.3d 391. 
113 Id. at 399. 
114 Id. (citations omitted). 
115 724 F.3d 533. 
116 Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545. 
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Because Williamson County is a prudential rather than 
a jurisdictional rule, we may determine that in some 
instances, the rule should not apply and we still have 
the power to decide the case.  This case is such an in-
stance.  Allowing the Town to invoke the Williamson 
County state-litigation requirement after removing the 
case to federal court would fail to fulfill the rationale 
for this prudential rule and would create the possibility 
for judicially condoned manipulation of litigation.117 
Relying on equitable considerations, the court then held removal of a 
takings claim categorically waives the state litigation requirement; 
[Waiving the state litigation rule in a removal case] 
protects an innocent plaintiff who sought to comply 
with Williamson County and San Remo Hotel but 
whose efforts were thwarted by the state or political 
subdivision’s decision to remove the case . . . .  [I]t 
prevents a state or its political subdivision from ma-
nipulating litigation by removing to federal court 
claims properly filed in state court in accordance with 
San Remo Hotel and then claiming that the plaintiff 
cannot proceed on those claims, thereby denying a 
plaintiff any forum for having his claim heard . . . 
[and] it furthers our ‘strong preference for deciding 
cases on the merits’ by preventing any procedural 
gamesmanship.118 
As Toloczko and Sansotta show, courts construing the state 
litigation ripeness rule as a prudential concept may refuse to apply 
the rule when doing so would cause unfairness and/or an inefficient 
expenditure of court and party resources.  Takings removal cases are 
an obvious candidate for the exercise of this discretion.  The Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling in Sansotta that federal courts can and should decline 
to enforce the state litigation rule after removal of a takings claim of-
fers a sensible, prudential solution to the Williamson County/removal 
problem.119  Defendants can still remove a takings case; fairness and 
 
117 Id. (first emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
118 Id. at 546-47 (citation omitted). 
119 See also Petersen v. Riverton City, No. 2:08-CV-664 SA, 2009 WL 564392, at *2 
(D. Utah March 5, 2009) (“During oral arguments, Defendant asserted that although San 
Remo Hotel states that Plaintiffs can bring state and federal takings actions in the same case, 
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other prudential considerations simply prevent them from subse-
quently arguing that the removed claim is unripe because the plaintiff 
failed to fully litigate in state court. 
The Williamson County/preclusion trap also loses its teeth, at 
least in some cases, when the state litigation rule is construed as a 
discretionary prudential ripeness concept.  As previously noted, the 
preclusion barrier to federal takings review arises from a rigid, juris-
dictional conception of the state litigation requirement, one that al-
ways requires takings plaintiffs to litigate in state court before resort-
ing to federal court.120  When the state litigation requirement is 
prudential and discretionary, some federal takings complaints can be 
filed directly in federal court121 and this leaves no room for a preclu-
sion barrier based on prior state litigation. 
D. Courts Are Correct to Consider Fairness and 
Efficiency in Deciding Whether to Apply the 
Prudential State Litigation Rule 
As courts fashion more exceptions to the state litigation rule 
on the ground that the rule is prudential and discretionary, the cor-
rectness of this approach is likely to be questioned. 
But there is little reason for concern.  Courts in the non-
takings context have long held that prudential ripeness concepts are 
discretionary and flexible,122 and can be waived.123  Moreover, such 
courts have routinely weighed considerations such as fairness to the 
parties124—including whether the plaintiff might lose a claim if re-
view is withheld,125 judicial economy and efficiency,126 and the histo-
 
that Plaintiffs’ federal claims should still be dismissed and the state claims sent back to state 
court because the state courts are better suited to address state constitutional claims.  Such a 
procedure is not required by San Remo Hotel and would be unduly burdensome to Plaintiffs.  
Plaintiffs filed this case in state court.  Defendants then chose to remove it to this court.  In 
doing so, Defendants chose to have the federal court decide Plaintiffs’ state constitutional 
claim.”). 
120 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
121 Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 399. 
122 Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d at 1142 (“Prudential considerations of 
ripeness are discretionary.”); American Sav. Bank, FSB v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 
436, 439 (2d Cir. 2003) (“ ‘[P]rudential ripeness’ . . . [is] ‘a more flexible doctrine of judicial 
prudence . . . .’ ”) (internal citations omitted). 
123 Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010). 
124 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (finding courts should consider 
“the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration”). 
125 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prod. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65, 110 
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ry of the litigation, in deciding whether to hold a claim prudentially 
ripe and afford immediate judicial review. 
Courts are therefore well within the mainstream of prudential 
ripeness law when they apply, or decline to apply, Williamson Coun-
ty’s state litigation ripeness rule based on prudential considerations.  
Indeed, courts are on more solid ground in giving great weight to 
fairness and efficiency concerns in the takings ripeness context, than 
in other areas, in light of the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated admoni-
tion that takings ripeness doctrine does not require “unfair” proce-
dures or “piecemeal litigation.”127 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Williamson County’s decision to hinge the accrual and ripe-
ness of a federal takings claim on a state court’s denial of damages is 
doctrinally bankrupt and unworkable in practice.128  By requiring 
state court litigation to ensure a taking is “without just compensa-
tion,” and fit for federal review, the Williamson County Court set the 
stage for property owners to lose access to the courts for protection of 
their Fifth Amendment rights.  A property owner who sues under 
state law in state court to ripen a federal takings claim will find that 
preclusion rules prevent the claim from being subsequently filed.  But 
if he files a Fifth Amendment takings claim in the state court, as San 
Remo indicates is proper, the claim can be immediately removed to 
federal court, where that court will likely hold it unripe due to the in-
choate state court procedures.129 
In light of these defects, the state litigation ripeness rule 
should be overruled.130  Unfortunately, that has not occurred.  Never-
theless, the state litigation ripeness requirement is not the monster it 
 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
126 United States v. Wayne, 591 F.3d 1326, 1329 n.1 (10th Cir 2010) (“[A] finding of 
ripeness promotes judicial efficiency . . . [and] this court has an interest in expeditiously re-
solving this action, rather than remanding it . . . .”). 
127 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7; 
see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 621 (2001) (“Government authorities, of 
course, may not burden property by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in 
order to avoid a final decision.”). 
128 See supra note 48. 
129 See supra notes 33, 70 and accompanying text. 
130 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“[A rule that] was not correct 
when it was decided, and . . . is not correct today . . . ought not to remain binding prece-
dent.”). 
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once was.  This is because the Supreme Court has recently and re-
peatedly clarified that the rule is not a jurisdictional predicate, but in-
stead, a mere “prudential” ripeness concept.131 
The rise of the prudential conception of the state litigation 
rule, and the related demise of the jurisdictional understanding,132 
imbues federal courts with discretion in applying the requirement, in-
cluding discretion to waive the state litigation rule.  Government de-
fendants—who could once count on courts to raise and apply the 
state litigation requirement sua sponte as a jurisdictional principle—
can now be held to have waived the requirement if they do not af-
firmatively plead and argue it.133  More importantly, courts may also 
waive the state litigation ripeness requirement under their prudential 
ripeness discretion when a defendant chooses to thwart state litigation 
by removing a takings case.134  Without the jurisdictional view of 
Williamson County prompting federal courts to strictly apply the state 
litigation rule, government defendants no longer have a free pass to 
invoke the state litigation ripeness doctrine after removal of a state 
court takings case as to deny the plaintiff state court review (by re-
moval) and a federal forum (by arguing the removed takings claim is 
unripe in federal court because the plaintiff did not exhaust state 
court litigation). 
Post-San Remo circuit court decisions have identified other 
situations in which federal courts may adjudicate property rights 
claims notwithstanding a lack of compliance with Williamson Coun-
ty’s state court litigation rule.  Federal courts can, for instance, direct-
ly hear takings claims when considerations of fairness, judicial econ-
omy, and efficiency weigh against additional rounds of (state court) 
litigation.135  This approach negates the San Remo preclusion barri-
er136 that arises in federal court when a plaintiff has litigated in state 
court in a (futile) attempt to ripen federal review of a takings claim, 
and is entirely consistent with decisions applying prudential ripeness 
concepts in non-takings contexts and with background takings ripe-
ness principles. 
The conversion of the state litigation rule into a prudential 
 
131 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra notes 112, 124-26 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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concept and the lower courts’ decision to view this as a license to de-
cline to apply the rule probably arise from the persistent, general con-
sensus that the requirement is not a well-reasoned or functional ripe-
ness concept.  The San Remo concurrence deserves particular credit 
for bringing Williamson County’s flaws and its limited, “prudential” 
nature to the attention of the lower courts, and to the newer Supreme 
Court justices themselves.137  While that concurrence has not resulted 
in the total repudiation of the state litigation requirement, as former 
Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently hoped, it may very well have 
started the state litigation requirement on a slow death spiral.  At the 
least, the Court’s recent characterization of Williamson County as 
“prudential” gives lower courts a sound basis to spare takings plain-
tiffs from the worst injustices of the state litigation rule until the Su-
preme Court finally puts it where it belongs: in the waste pile of 
failed constitutional doctrines.138 
 
 
137 See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
138 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 534 (2005) (repudiating the rule that a 
taking occurs when a regulation “fails to substantially advance legitimate state interest[s]” 
twenty-five years after that rule was articulated). 
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